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Abstract 
The aim of this study was to examine attentional biases of hypervigilance and 
disengagement difficulty in spider fear. Twenty-eight females between the ages of 
18-36 years were grouped into high (n=14) and low (n=14) fear groups and 
completed a modified spatial cueing task comprising photographic cues of spiders 
(feared stimulus), beetles (neutral stimulus) and butterflies (positive valence 
stimulus). Cues were either valid (appeared on the same side as the target), or invalid 
(appearing on the opposite side). It was hypothesised that high fear participants 
would show faster reaction time and greater P1 amplitude following valid spider cues 
as an indicator of hypervigilance, and slower reaction times following invalid spider 
cues indexing disengagement difficulty. Instead, high fear participants showed 
greater reaction time to all targets, with this increase greater following spider cues. 
These findings were interpreted as interference following feared stimuli. P1 
amplitude was higher overall in the high fear group, but both groups showed greater 
amplitude following spider cues relative to beetle and butterfly cues. Enhanced P1 
amplitude in the high fear group was interpreted as increased attentional processing 
following feared images. This research provides preliminary support for Attentional 
Control Theory (ACT; Eyesenck et al., 2007) and suggests emphasis on attentional 
mechanisms in the treatment of spider fear.  
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Attentional bias is the facilitated attention toward or away from a stimulus, 
and plays a central role in the aetiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders (Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg & van Ijzendoorn, 2007). The 
attentional bias towards threat is well documented (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & 
Koster, 2010; Van Bockstaele et al., 2013), however, the specific modes of attention 
that are affected are still under investigation.  
Early neural processes involved in attentional bias involve the facilitated 
detection and processing of threatening stimuli, known as hypervigilance. This may 
be followed by difficulty disengaging attention from threatening stimuli in order to 
shift and re-engage attention elsewhere (Bar-Haim, Lamy & Glickman, 2005; Cisler 
& Koster, 2010). These findings have been demonstrated through behavioural 
measures such as reaction time and electrophysiological measures by way of event-
related potentials (ERPs). According to Posner and Petersen’s (1990) attentional 
network model, these functions are likely to be orchestrated by the orienting module 
of attention, which determines engagement, shifting and disengagement from stimuli. 
These early neural processes form an important process in anxiety disorders, 
including specific phobia. With a population prevalence of 3.5% (Fredrikson, Annas, 
Fischer, & Wik, 1996) one of the most common subtypes of specific phobia is fear of 
spiders. As in anxiety disorders generally, arachnophobia is more likely to affect 
females than males (Leutgeb, Sarlo, Schongasser & Schienle et al., 2015). In order to 
provide effective treatments for this population, it is important that the neural 
mechanisms involved in anxiety disorders are comprehensively understood. Research 
in this area will enable treatments to be more effective by targeting the underlying 
cognitive processes more accurately. For example, recent research (Fox, Zougkou, 
Ashwin & Cahill, 2015), has shown success using attention bias modification.  
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The Attentional Network Model 
Posner and Petersen (1990) proposed a model of attention comprising three 
components: alerting, orienting, and executive control. Alerting refers to the level of 
arousal required to attend to a stimulus; orienting encompasses the shifting, 
engagement and disengagement of attention; whilst the executive control network 
orchestrates goal-directed action and response control. The attentional module of 
interest in this research is the orienting network. In their recent conceptualisation, 
Petersen and Posner (2012) proposed that there are two separate processes within the 
orienting network, the bottom-up (ventral system) and top-down (dorsal system). 
The attentional network model (Posner & Petersen, 2012), links to 
Attentional Control Theory (ACT; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo 2007). 
ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) posits that anxiety results in disruption between the 
orienting and executive control networks of the attention system, characterised by 
increased bottom-up (stimulus driven) processing and decreased top-down (goal-
directed) processing, leading to increased dependence on the orienting system in 
response to a stimulus, and less influence from the executive control system 
(Eysenck et al., 2007). For example, goal-directed action (such as responding to a 
target in an experimental task) is delayed due to stimulus driven impulses, such as 
being in the presence of a feared stimulus.  
Attentional Biases and the Orienting Network 
Despite the prevalence of specific phobia, there is a lack of research on the 
attentional mechanisms of specific fear. The majority of research investigating 
attentional bias in visual paradigms has been limited to the differences between high 
and low trait anxious individuals. Whilst this is useful literature to review in order to 
inform potential mechanisms of specific fear, state anxiety is more similar to specific 
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fear than trait anxiety. However, research on state anxiety is again limited (Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Van Bockstaele et al., 2013). 
Hypervigilance to threat-related stimuli is a robust attentional bias 
mechanism that has been established in trait anxious individuals allocating 
preferential attention to threatening stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Hypervigilance 
is indexed experimentally through faster reaction times following threatening images 
appearing as informative cues preceding a target in visual attention tasks (such as 
dot-probe and spatial cueing (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Van 
Bockstaele et al., 2013). This difference between anxious and non-anxious 
individuals has also been demonstrated through electrophysiological measures 
(Armstrong, Hemminger & Olatunji, 2013; Fox, Russo, Bowles & Dutton, 2001; 
Johnstone, 2015; Leutgeb et al., 2015; Pflugshaupt et al., 2005; Rinck & Becker, 
2006; Rossignol, Campanella, Bissot & Philippot, 2013). After initial hypervigilance, 
it has been suggested that threat-related stimuli result in two further potential 
mechanisms of attentional bias: a) the impaired ability to disengage attention away 
from threatening stimuli, or b) the swift shifting of attention away from threat, or 
avoidance, as indexed by differences in reaction time following threat-related versus 
neutral cues in visual attention tasks (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Fox et al., 2001). In 
previous research on trait-anxious individuals, delayed disengagement (indexed by 
greater reaction time when reorienting attention away from threatening stimuli) is 
more readily observed with short stimulus durations (100ms-200ms; Koster, 
Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, Wiersema, 2006a). 
Evidence in support of attentional biases has been demonstrated in the 
literature by utilising a variety of experimental paradigms, including the dot-probe 
task (MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986). This task involves the simultaneous 
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horizontal presentation of threatening and neutral stimuli on a computer screen for a 
brief duration (~500ms), followed by a target or probe appearing on the screen after 
the stimuli have disappeared. This probe is randomised to appear in place of one of 
the stimuli, and the participant is required to indicate via button press on which side 
the probe appears (MacLeod et al., 1986). Hypervigilance and disengagement 
difficulty are well-replicated phenomena in trait anxious participants completing the 
dot-probe task, such that hypervigilance is demonstrated by faster reaction times 
compared to controls when the probe appears on the same side as a threatening rather 
than neutral stimulus (Lipp & Derakshan, 2005; Mogg & Bradley 2006). 
Disengagement difficulty is indexed by slower reaction times compared to controls 
when the probe replaces a neutral stimulus, suggesting that the threat-related 
stimulus captures and holds attention in those with higher trait or state anxiety 
(Koster, Crombez, Verschuere & De Houwer, 2006b; Yiend & Mathews, 2001) 
Koster and colleagues (2006b) used a dot-probe task to compare attentional 
biases in high and low trait anxious participants. They found that high trait anxious 
individuals produced greater reaction times to both moderate and high threat images 
in comparison to the low trait anxious group, who only demonstrated an increase in 
reaction time in high threat conditions. This result in the high trait anxious group was 
interpreted as evidence of disengagement difficulty in shifting attention from the 
moderate threat images. Other evidence for disengagement difficulty was found by 
Yiend and Mathews (2001) utilising a dot-probe task. High and low trait anxious 
individuals were compared on reaction times to targets cued by threatening and non-
threatening pictorial cues in a dot-probe task. They found a general slowing effect in 
the high trait anxious participants following threatening cues, which was interpreted 
as difficulty disengaging from threat in combination with a more generalised 
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interference effect positively correlated with perceived level of threat. 
In research specifically investigating these mechanisms in spider fearful 
individuals, Lipp and Derakshan (2005) discovered that high spider fear participants 
responded faster to target probes replacing spider relative to neutral picture cues in a 
dot probe task as compared with low spider fear participants, indexing 
hypervigilance. Similarly, in a dot probe paradigm Mogg and Bradley (2006) found 
that high spider fear participants showed a greater hypervigilance towards spider 
stimuli than low fear participants. An additional finding in this study was associated 
with varying exposure durations (200, 500 and 2000ms), with high fear participants 
showing that as exposure duration increased, hypervigilance decreased, as indexed 
by greater reaction time following longer exposure (Mogg & Bradley, 2006). 
Another useful paradigm to assess attentional biases in the orienting network 
is the spatial cuing task (Posner, 1980). It has been suggested that the spatial cueing 
task presents a less problematic assessment of attentional capture because only one 
stimulus is presented at a time, unlike the dot-probe task (Derryberry & Reed, 1994). 
This experimental paradigm aims to differentiate between attentional engagement 
and disengagement by separating these components (Clarke, MacLeod & Guastella, 
2013). In an archetypal spatial cueing task, participants are required to focus their 
vision on a central fixation point until a central (endogenous) or peripheral 
(exogenous) cue facilitates a visual attentional shift to a particular location, usually 
left or right of the central fixation point, followed by the presentation of a target 
requiring a response. It has been suggested that exogenous cues yield facilitatory 
effects when the latency between cue and target is less than 200ms (Fox et al., 2001). 
In invalidly cued trials, the cue directs attention to the opposite side of the computer 
monitor, or the un-cued location, before the target is presented. Conversely, valid 
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targets appear at the cued location (Vandenberghe & Gillebert, 2013). In comparison 
to the dot-probe paradigm, the spatial cueing task allows definitive analysis of the 
processes of hypervigilance and disengagement by presenting a single pictorial cue 
(feared or neutral) for each trial at the same (valid) or opposite (invalid) spatial 
location to the target (Fox et al., 2001). In research focussing on trait anxious 
individuals, images have mostly been of threat-related or neutral facial expressions 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007). At the present time there is minimal research using the 
spatial cueing task to assess attentional biases in spider fear. 
Koster and colleagues (2006a) utilised a spatial cueing task to compared the 
performance of high versus low trait anxious individuals to targets cued by neutral, 
highly threatening or moderately threatening images. In the 100ms exposure times, 
shorter reaction times were demonstrated by high trait anxious participants following 
valid threat cues, whilst greater response times were found in high trait anxious 
participants following threatening invalid cues, demonstrating disengagement 
difficulty to threatening stimuli. High trait anxious participants also demonstrated 
greater response times to valid highly threatening cues presented for longer durations 
of 200ms and 500ms. The authors concluded that longer latencies are more likely 
than shorter latencies to produce attentional avoidance following threat, rather than 
disengagement difficulty (Koster et al., 2006a). This built on research conducted the 
previous year by Bar-Haim and colleagues (2005), who obtained robust evidence for 
attentional bias in anxiety through increased reaction times. In this study, participants 
were allocated into high and low anxiety groups based on upper and lower quartiles 
of scores obtained on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Speilberger, 1983) 
and completed an endogenous spatial cueing task. High anxiety participants 
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exhibited slower response times regardless of facial expression cue (angry, neutral, 
fearful, happy and sad) in comparison to low anxiety participants. 
In similar research focussing on specific fear, Amir and colleagues (2003) 
used a modified spatial cueing paradigm with threat-related and neutral words as 
cues to assess attentional bias in social phobia. Two-thirds of all trials were validly 
cued, and one-third invalidly cued. They found that participants demonstrated longer 
response times following presentation of invalid cues and shorter latencies following 
validly cued targets as would be expected through a general effect of validity. 
However, this effect only appeared in trials where the target followed a social threat-
related word rather than a neutral word. Amir et al. (2003) concluded that individuals 
with social phobia had difficulty disengaging their attention from social threat-
related words relative to controls as indexed by longer reaction times following an 
invalid threat-related cue.  
Thus far, the only spatial cueing paradigm that has been used to assess 
attentional biases in spider fear has been by Johnstone (2015). Johnstone used a 
modified spatial cueing task to assess early attention differences between high and 
low spider fear participants. This task comprised photographic cues of spiders and 
cows with 50% valid and 50% invalid targets comprising 128 trials. Hypotheses were 
in line with findings in similar tasks assessing trait anxiety, with faster reaction times 
following valid spider cues in high fear participants compared to low fear 
participants as evidence of hypervigilance. As evidence for disengagement, it was 
hypothesised that high fear participants would obtain greater reaction times 
compared to low fear participants following invalid spider cues, as the feared 
stimulus would capture and hold attention. Neither of these hypotheses were 
supported. Instead, Johnstone (2015) found greater reaction times in high fear 
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participants following both image types which was interpreted as interference in the 
goal-directed task of responding to targets. 
Neuro-anatomical Structures of Attentional Bias 
It has been suggested that both voluntary and involuntary visual attention 
processes are modulated at their earliest point in the middle occipital gyrus, within 
the extrastriate cortex, before activation is seen in the primary visual cortex (Fu, 
Greenwood & Parasuraman, 2005). Research using fMRI has shown that neural 
networks activated during endogenous and exogenous orienting include the anterior 
cingulate cortex, precuneus, cuneus, and the temporoparietal junction centering on 
the supramarginal gyrus and extending to the superior temporal lobe (Peelen, 
Heslenfeld & Theeuwes, 2004). 
It is thought that early attentional biases such hypervigilance may involve an 
amygdala response due to automatic fear responses generated following exposure to 
threat relevant stimuli (Cisler & Koster, 2010). This is consistent with research 
positing that the amygdala receives visual threat-related information via the 
magnocellular route and thalamo-amygdala connection which transmits information 
to the visual cortex (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Öhman, 2009). 
In their most recent conceptualisation of the attentional network model, 
Petersen and Posner (2012) differentiated between the dorasal attention system (top-
down visuospatial orienting), and the ventral attention system (bottom-up 
reorienting). Based a review of imaging research of attention by Corbetta and 
Shulman (2002), they propose that the dorsal system is comprised of frontal eye 
fields and the intraparietal sulcus/superior parietal lobe, whilst the ventral attention 
system consists of certain regions within the temporoparietal junction and the ventral 
frontal cortex (Petersen & Posner, 2012). 
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Electrophysiological Correlates of Attention 
Neural activity elicited by attentional biases can be measured using event-
related-potentials (ERPs). ERPs are time-locked recordings of electrophysiological 
activity generated by the brain in response to stimuli, which are recorded on the scalp 
using electroencephalographic (EEG) technology (Dennis & Chen, 2007; Woodman, 
2010). Whilst ERPs are a useful measure in assessing the temporality of neural 
processes, there is a surprising lack of ERP research investigating the early neural 
processes involved in attention and how these may be modulated by anxiety and fear 
in attentional tasks. There is no current ERP component which provides consistent 
evidence for disengagement difficulties. However, it has been suggested by several 
studies that the P1 component is a potential marker of facilitated attention towards 
threat.  
P1 Component. The P1 is a positive polarity event-related potential (ERP) 
occurring approximately 100ms post stimulus, which indexes early visual processing 
and may be modulated by attention and arousal (Hillyard, Luck, & Mangun, 1994). It 
is maximal in ERP studies at lateral occipital sites, and peaks approximately 80-
130ms post-stimulus (Hillyard, Luck, & Mangun, 1994). Previous research has 
demonstrated that variations in the posterior P1 component are associated with early 
visual processing and automatic orienting of attention to visual stimuli (Dennis & 
Chen, 2007; Kolassa, Musial, Kolassa & Miltner, 2006). The P1 component is 
generated in the extra-striate visual areas and is considered to index hypervigilance, 
or facilitated attention towards threat (Kolassa et al., 2006). The P1 component is 
enhanced in exogenous attentional paradigms, attaining greater amplitude for validly 
cued trials in comparison to invalidly cued trials (Chica Bartolomeo & Lupiáñez 
2013; Eimer, 1998; Fu, Fan, Chen & Zhuo, 2001; Hopfinger & West, 2006; Luck, 
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1995; Mangun, 1995; Talsma, Mulckhuyse, Slagter & Theeuwes, 2007). 
Spider fear is particularly amenable to ERP studies of attentional bias as even 
schematic images can induce enhanced P1 amplitude in spider phobic participants 
(Venettacci, 2014). However, studies investigating P1 amplitude differences in 
spider fear are minimal, with researchers utilising different tasks and investigating 
later ERP components. Kolassa and colleagues (2006) compared participants with 
spider phobia to clinical controls (social phobia) and non-phobic control participants 
using an emotional Stroop task comprising schematic spider and flower images. 
They found that both phobic groups demonstrated increased P1 amplitude following 
exposure to both image types in comparison to control participants. They concluded 
that early ERP components are modified by anxiety status and not necessarily by 
exposure to representations of the specific phobia.  
To date, the only modified spatial cueing paradigm assessing high and low 
spider fear participants is that of Johnstone (2015). Johnstone hypothesised that high 
fear participants would generate greater P1 amplitude to spider images compared to 
low fear participants, however, this was not supported. No significant difference in 
peak P1 amplitude was observed between groups following exposure to spider or 
cow images, in fact, the low fear group showed increased P1 amplitude following 
spider images versus cow images. Johnstone (2015) concluded that this general 
hypervigilance is indicative of a phylogenetic mechanism in low fear participants. 
Rationale and aim  
Research in attentional biases of specific phobia has been limited as the 
majority of research has focussed on trait anxious individuals rather than state 
anxiety, which is more closely linked to specific phobia (Mogg, Holmes, Garner & 
Bradley, 2008). There is also a need for closer analysis of electrophysiological 
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markers of attentional bias in specific phobia, as the majority of literature thus far 
relies on behavioural measures (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Van 
Bockstaele et al., 2013). Cisler and Koster (2010) surmised that thorough 
investigation of the attentional components of hypervigilance, avoidance and 
disengagement difficulty is required in order to gain comprehensive understanding of 
the cognitive functions involved in the maintenance of specific fear and anxiety 
disorders. Research in this area will inform treatment techniques for specific fear 
such as attention bias modification, which targets underlying cognitive processes 
involved in attentional bias (Fox et al., 2015). 
The aim of this research is to add to previous evidence of hypervigilance and 
disengagement difficulty in high fear participants following exposure to spider 
images in order to build upon the research conducted by Johnstone (2015). A 
modified spatial cueing paradigm was designed for this research to include not only 
feared (spider) and neutral (beetle) images, but also a positive valence image 
(butterfly). Further modifications were made to this task such that more trials were 
included (576 in total, with 192 trials per image type compared to Johnstone’s 128 
trials with 64 per image type). The percentage of valid trials was increased from 50% 
to 75% in order to reach consistency with other spatial cueing paradigms finding 
behavioural evidence of hypervigilance and disengagement difficulty (Fox et al., 
2001; Mogg et al., 2008). Fox and colleagues (2002) postulated that a higher 
proportion of valid cues ensures that participants learn to rely on the cue as a useful 
indicator of upcoming target location, therefore eliciting attentional biases. As 
suggested by Chica Martín-Arévalo, Botta and Lupiáñez (2014), a discrimination 
task (where the participant presses the left button in response to one target type, for 
example, a horizontal dot pair, and a right button response indicating a vertical dot 
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pair) was chosen over a detection task (where the participant simply indicates with a 
corresponding button press whether the target appears in the right or left visual 
hemifield). This was implemented in order to increase cognitive load and intensify 
facilitatory effects. It is suspected that these changes may better elicit both 
disengagement difficulty as well as both specific and general hypervigilance in high 
fear participants. 
Hypotheses 
Utilising a modified spatial cueing it was hypothesised that high fear 
participants would show faster reaction times following valid spider cues as an 
indicator of hypervigilance compared to low fear participants (Lipp & Derakshan 
(2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2006), and that this would be followed by beetle cues and 
butterfly cues respectively. Based on research by Kolassa and colleagues (2006), it 
was hypothesised that hypervigilance among high fear participants would be 
demonstrated by greater P1 amplitude compared to low fear participants, and that 
this amplitude would decrease over beetle and butterfly image conditions 
respectively. As evidence for disengagement difficulty, based on research by Koster 
and colleagues, (2006a), it was hypothesised that high fear participants would display 
slower reaction times following invalid spider cues compared to low fear 
participants. 
Method 
Participants 
Ethical approval was gained through the University of Tasmania Human 
Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix B). A total of 319 participants were 
recruited via advertisements placed on University of Tasmania (UTas) campuses and 
community notice boards in the Hobart region, Tasmania. Participants were screened 
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using the Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Watts & Sharrock, 1984). Exclusion 
criteria included neurological, sleep or psychiatric disorders (excluding major 
depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder), head injury, epilepsy, current 
pregnancy, illicit drug use within the past month, and use of alcohol within the past 
24 hours. In addition to participants’ medical history, screening was undertaken 
using the Kessler Psychological Distress scale (K10; Kessler et al., 2002) and the 
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Babor et al., 2001), excluding 
participants with scores greater than 36 and 19 respectively. Respondents meeting 
eligibility criteria were invited to attend a two-hour experimental session at the 
University of Tasmania.  
A total of 35 participants aged 18-36 (M=22.3, SD=4.9) years completed the 
experimental session. First year undergraduate psychology students received two 
hours course credit for participation. Seven participants’ data were excluded due to 
scores above the median on the secondary measure of spider fear, the Fear of Spiders 
Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995) (n=3), accuracy below 70% 
on any individual condition (n=1), excess artifacts in ERP data (n=1), and outlying 
reaction times as assessed by box and whisker plots for each condition (1.5 times >  
interquartile range; n=2).  
The final sample comprised 28 participants. The high spider fear group 
(n=14) scored 14 and greater on the SPQ, while the low spider fear group (n=14) 
obtained scores of seven and below. All participant scores were within the 25th 
(scores 6 and below) and 75th percentiles (scores 14 and above), except one 
participant with a score of seven included in the low fear group. Participant groups 
were compared on caffeine and nicotine consumption, illicit drug use, handedness, 
and education level. 
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Materials and Apparatus 
 Questionnaire Measures. The Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Watts & 
Sharrock, 1984) was used as the primary measure of spider fear and to assign 
participants to either low or high fear categories. The SPQ comprises 43 yes/no 
questions regarding sensitivity to spiders (e.g., “Are you always on the lookout for 
spiders?”). The questions are designed to indicate cognitive-behavioural dimensions 
of vigilance, preoccupation, coping and avoidance in response to spiders. The SPQ 
subscale measuring spider knowledge was excluded for the purposes of this research, 
resulting in a total of 33 questions. Five questions are reverse-scored to control 
response bias. The SPQ possesses good test-retest reliability (r=0.94) and internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α =0.91) (Muris & Merchelbach, 1996).  
The Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995) 
was used as a secondary measure of spider fear. The FSQ is sensitive in detecting 
spider fear in phobic as well as sub-clinical individuals (Muris & Merchelbach, 
1996). The FSQ comprises 18 questions designed to assess phobic symptoms (e.g., 
“If I encountered a spider now, I wouldn’t be able to deal effectively with it”). 
Answers are measured on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (definitely not) 
to 7 (absolutely). The FSQ possesses good test-retest reliability (r=0.91), and internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α=0.97) (Muris & Merchelbach, 1996).  
The Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10; Kessler et al., 2002) is a 10 
item scale measuring psychological distress on a six-point Likert scale. Questions 
require participants to rate their experiences of psychological distress over the 
preceding four weeks (e.g., “Did you feel so restless that you could not sit still?”). 
Responses ranged from 1 (all of the time) to 6 (none of the time), with lower scores 
indicative of lower psychological distress. Scores range from 10 to 50. This research 
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excluded participants with a high level of psychological distress as indexed by scores 
over 36 (Kessler et al., 2002). The K10 possesses good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α=0.93) (Kessler et al., 2002).  
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Form Y-2 (STAI; Speilberger, 1983) is a 
20-item inventory used to assess trait anxiety, including feelings of stress, worry and 
discomfort. The STAI contains questions relating to how the individual generally 
feels (e.g., “I feel inadequate”). Responses are given via a four-point Likert scale 
from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always), with higher scores positively correlated 
with trait anxiety. This was included to compare participants on measures of trait 
anxiety and to control for confounding effects. The STAI possesses good test-retest 
reliability (r=0.69-0.89) and internal consistency (Cronbach’s α=0.86-0.95) 
(Spielberger et al., 1983).  
The Weschler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR; Wechsler, 2001) is a test used 
to measure intellectual functioning and is comprised of 50 words with irregular 
grapheme-to-phoneme correspondence requiring accurate pronunciation. Each 
correctly pronounced word equals a score of one. The WTAR possesses good 
concurrent validity, with scores highly correlated with measures of verbal 
comprehension (r=0.74), verbal IQ (r=0.75), and full-scale IQ (r=0.73; Wechsler, 
2001). Scores were used to compare intellectual functioning between high and low 
fear groups. 
The Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Babor et al., 2001) is 
designed to identify problem drinkers and comprises ten questions covering 
hazardous alcohol use and dependence symptoms. The AUDIT was used as a 
screening tool to control for confounding effects of alcohol on brain activity, with 
participants scoring higher than 19 excluded. 
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The Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS; Akerstedt & Gillberg, 1990) was used 
to measure participants’ alertness on the day of testing. The KSS is a single question 
(“how do you feel at the present moment?”). Participants answered by selecting a 
score on a nine-point scale with scores ranging from one (“extremely alert”) to nine 
(“extremely sleepy”).  
The Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1982) was utilised 
prior to task commencement and in three breaks during the experimental task to 
assess temporally relevant state anxiety. Participants are required to indicate their 
current level of anxiety on a scale of 0 (“no anxiety”) to 100 (“extreme anxiety”).  
Participants were also asked a video gaming experience question (VGEQ) 
which was custom made by researchers examining attentional biases at UTas the 
previous year (Johnstone, 2015). The question is “How often would you normally 
play video games?”) with five response choices ranging from (“never play video 
games”) to (“often play video games - more than 5 hours a week”).  
Spatial Cueing Paradigm. The spatial cueing task used in this research was 
presented using NeuroScan STIM 3.1 software. Written instructions were presented 
on screen, followed by 10 practice trials. The test phase comprised 576 trials 
presented in random order, with four blocks of 144 trials. Participants were given 
breaks between each block in order to rate their current level of anxiety and refocus 
their attention. Trials commenced with a central fixation cross (500ms) followed by a 
pictorial cue appearing in the left or right visual hemifield which was either fear-
relevant (spider), neutral (beetle), or positive valence (butterfly). This image was 
presented on screen for 200ms. This was followed after an interstimulus interval 
(ISI) of 50ms by a target comprised of vertical or horizontal dot pairs presented for 
2000ms appearing in the left or right visual hemifield. The pictorial cue either validly 
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(appeared on the same side; 75% of trials), or invalidly (appeared on the opposite 
side; 25% of trials) predicted the target. The centre of each image measured 3.5cm 
away from the central fixation cross. Participants were instructed to respond via 
button press on a NeuroScan response pad, with vertical dot pairs requiring a left 
button response and horizontal dot pairs requiring a right button response. Intertrial 
intervals (ITI) between the target and the subsequent trial were varied randomly, with 
intervals set at 2100ms, 2200ms, or 2300ms.  
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the modified spatial cueing task with example 
images for each cue type (neutral, feared and positive valence). 
 
Photographs of spiders, beetles and butterflies used in this task were sourced 
from the internet via Flickr (2016) and Encyclopedia of Life (2016), and were 
Creative Commons licenced. Images were cropped and resized to measure 8cm by 
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6cm. Each image category comprised 24 different images, with the task repeating 
each image eight times. 
Electroencephalographic (EEG) Recording. EEG data was recorded via 
NeuroSCAN system (Scan 4.5 system) and 32 channel Quik-Cap with Ag/AgCl 
sintered electrodes mounted to adhere to the international 10-20 system of electrode 
placement. Electro-oculographic (EOG) activity was monitored via electrodes placed 
on the outer canthi of both eyes (horizontal EOG) and supra- and infra-orbitally 
(vertical EOG), and referenced to linked mastoids. Continuous EEG data was 
recorded from 32 sites and sampled continuously at a rate of 1000Hz, whilst 
electrical impedance was kept below 10kΩ. Behavioural data was merged with 
continuous EEG data offline, and data was filtered with a low pass zero phase shift 
filter (30Hz, 24dB/Oct). Ocular artifact rejection was used to minimise the impact of 
eye blinks on other electrode channels. Due to short inter-stimulus intervals (ISI), 
cue-related components were visible in the pre-stimulus interval for the target. 
Therefore, a long pre-stimulus interval was chosen to obtain an adequate baseline, 
with epochs extracted from 300ms before stimulus onset to 700ms post stimulus. 
Baseline correction was conducted, followed by artifact rejection, with trials 
containing artefacts above 70 µV and below -70 µV rejected. Occipital P1 
component was determined from grand averaged waveforms from lateral occipital 
sites (O1 and O2) for each condition and was defined as the maximum amplitude 
between 70-140ms post target onset.  
Procedure 
Informed consent was obtained (see Appendix C) and online screening was 
used to collect participant demographics, brief medical history, fear of spiders (SPQ, 
FSQ), alcohol use (AUDIT), and psychological distress (K10). Participants that met 
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inclusion criteria were invited to attend a two-hour experimental session and 
instructed to abstain from alcohol for 24 hours, and from caffeine and nicotine two 
hours prior to testing. Upon arrival, participants provided details regarding caffeine 
intake, medication usage and current menstrual phase, before completing the 
Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (Akerstedt & Gillberg, 1990), the STAI (Speilberger, 
1983) and the WTAR (Wechsler, 2001; see Appendix A).  
An elasticised EEG cap was fitted to the participant’s head and electrodes applied 
with conductive gel. Participants were seated approximately 50cm in front of the 
computer monitor to complete two tasks in standardised order; a Flanker go/nogo 
task which was used in a separate study, and the pictorial spatial cueing paradigm for 
this study. In preparation for the task, participants were asked to respond as quickly 
and accurately as possible to targets presented on screen, whilst maintaining visual 
focus on the central fixation cross to minimise potential eye movements. Prior to task 
commencement and during three breaks in the experimental task, participants were 
asked to rate their anxiety levels on the 100-point Subjective Units of Distress Scale 
(SUDS). Once the spatial cueing task was completed, participants rated the arousal 
(1=low arousal to 9=highly arousing) and valence (1=highly unpleasant to 9=highly 
pleasant) of each photograph used in the task using a 9-point Likert scale. Each 
image was displayed on the computer monitor for a duration of 2000ms before 
participants were prompted to select a rating for each category. Once a rating had 
been selected for each category, the following image was displayed. This task 
continued until all images used in the task had been rated for valence and arousal. At 
this point, participants were debriefed and thanked for their time.   
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Design and Data Analysis 
Analysis of mean reaction time was conducted using a 2(Group: High fear, 
Low fear) x 2(Cue: Valid, Invalid) x 3(Image: Spider, Butterfly, Beetle) mixed 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Incorrect trials and response times greater 
than three standard deviations for each individual's mean were excluded from 
analysis. 
Electrophysiological measures comprised analysis of peak P1 amplitude. 
Analysis of peak P1 component was assessed via a 2(Group: High fear, Low fear) x 
2(Cue: Valid, Invalid) x 3(Image: Spider, Butterfly, Beetle) x 2(Visual Field: Left, 
Right) x 2(Laterality: Contralateral, Ipsilateral) mixed measures ANOVA. Given that 
P1 amplitude is typically greater at contralateral sites, extra variables of visual field 
and laterality were included in this analysis to account for potential variance. 
Additional analysis of arousal and valence to the photographic images was 
conducted to compare ratings given by low versus high fear groups. This analysis 
was performed using a 2(Group: High fear, low fear) x 3(Images: Spider, butterfly, 
beetle) mixed measures ANOVA. Anxiety was assessed between high and low fear 
groups by comparing SUDS ratings prior to task commencement (rating 1), and 
during each block break (rating 2, rating 3, and rating 4). This was assessed with a 2 
(Group: high fear, low fear) x 4 (Time: rating 1, rating 2, rating 3, rating 4) mixed 
measures ANOVA.   
Significant interactions were assessed by investigating simple main effects to 
find where differences between variables occurred. Post-hoc analyses adhered to an 
alpha level of 0.05 as an indicator of statistical significance, which was maintained 
using Bonferroni corrections. When independent variables exceeded two levels (i.e., 
included the variable of Image: spider, butterfly, beetle), sphericity was controlled 
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via Greenhouse-Geisser corrections. Effect size was reported as partial eta squared in 
main effects and interactions, with values of >.01 considered small, >.09 as medium, 
and >.14 interpreted as large effects. Hedge’s g was used to ascertain effect size of 
simple main effects, with values of >.2 considered small, >.5 as medium, and >.8 
interpreted as large effects. Practice trials were not included in analyses. Significant 
and hypothesis-specific F-tests are included in the results section, whilst hypothesis 
relevant non-significant F-tests (p >.05) can be found in Table 1, Appendix D. 
Results 
Demographics 
Table 1 shows the mean age and mean raw scores on questionnaire measures 
for each group. There was a significant difference in spider fear between groups, 
with the high fear group obtaining significantly higher scores on measures of spider 
fear (SPQ, FSQ). There were no significant differences between groups on age, 
alcohol dependence (AUDIT), sleepiness on day of testing (KSS), and hours of sleep 
the night previous. Measures of trait anxiety (STAI), verbal intelligence (WTAR), 
and psychological distress (K10) were trending toward significance, with moderate 
effect sizes noted such that the high fear group attained greater scores on the STAI 
and K10, while the low fear group scored higher on the WTAR. 
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Table 1 
Mean Age, Hours of Sleep, and Raw Scores on Measures of Spider Fear, Anxiety, 
Reading Ability, Video Game Experience and alertness for Low and High Fear 
Spider Groups 
 Low Fear High Fear    
 M(SD) M(SD) F(1, 26) p Hedge’s g 
Age (years) 23.4 (5.2) 22.4 (5.7) 0.2 .204 0.17 
Sleep (hours) 7.9 (2.0) 7.8 (1.1) 0.03 .862 0.06 
SPQ/33 3.4 (1.8) 19.1 (4.7) 135.7 <.001 4.27 
FSQ/126 24.7 (7.3) 96.9 (13.0) 327.3 <.001 6.64 
STAI Y-2/20 34.5 (9.1) 41.4 (10.0) 3.6 .069 0.69 
WTAR/50 39.8 (6.0) 35.2 (8.0) 2.9 .098 0.63 
K10/10 15.4 (5.7) 19.4 (6.1) 3.2 .085 0.66 
AUDIT/10 2.4 (1.6) 5.4 (4.7) 0.4 .511 0.25 
VGEQ/1 2.4 (1.2) 2.6 (1.8) 0.1 .765 0.11 
KSS/1 5.3 (1.7) 5.2 (1.8) 0.0 .915 0.04 
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
Accuracy 
 Table 2 shows the mean accuracy to targets following spider, butterfly and 
beetle cues during valid and invalid conditions. Analysis of accuracy (percentage of 
correct trials) showed a significant main effect of Image, F(2, 47)=3.6, p=.033, 
hp2=.12, such that accuracy was significantly lower following spider cues (M=93.8, 
SD=3.3), compared to butterfly cues (M=95.2, SD=2.0; p=.022, g= .51). However, 
despite a moderate effect size, this comparison does not remain significant with a 
Bonferroni correction applied (a=.017). There were no significant differences 
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between spider and beetle cues (M=94.4, SD=2.7; p=.274, g=.20), or butterfly versus 
beetle cues (p=.076, g=.34). 
 
Table 2 
Mean Accuracy (%) to Targets Following Spider, Butterfly and Beetle Cues in Valid 
and Invalid Trials for High and Low Fear Spider Groups 
 Spider  Butterfly  Beetle 
 Valid Invalid  Valid Invalid  Valid Invalid 
Low Fear 94.4 (4.0) 93.5 (7.0)  95.7 (3.1) 94.8 (3.9)  96.1 (3.4) 94.6 (5.1) 
High Fear 93.6 (4.0) 93.6 (4.7)  95.1 (3.0) 95.2 (3.4)  93.6 (4.2) 93.3 (4.0) 
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
Reaction Time 
 Figure 2 shows the mean reaction time for targets following each image type 
in high and low fear groups. There was a significant main effect of Group, F(1, 
26)=5.5, p=.028, hp2=.17, indicating that reaction times were significantly greater in 
the high fear group (M=596.4, SD=59.5) compared to the low fear group (M=516.9, 
SD=59.5). The main effect of Validity was significant, F(1,26)=16.5, p<.001, hp2 = 
.39, with reaction times to invalid targets (M=551.4, SD=45.0) significantly greater 
than reaction times to valid targets (M=534.9, SD=40.4) across all participants and 
images. The main effect of Image was also significant, F(2, 43)=3.5, p=.037, hp2 = 
.12, which was qualified by a significant Image x Group interaction, F(2, 43)=3.5, p 
= .047, hp2= 12. This indicated a significant effect of Image in the high fear group, 
F(2, 21)=4.7, p = .027, hp2= .27. Pairwise comparisons indicated that high fear 
participants attained significantly greater reaction times to targets following spider 
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cues (M=579.4, SD=68.7), compared to both butterfly cues (M=566.2, SD=63.4; 
p=.011, g=.19) and beetle cues (M=562.7, SD=74.9; p=.005, g=.23), whilst the 
comparison of butterfly and beetle cues was non-significant, (p=.335, g=.05). Tests 
of the simple effect of Group for each image (Bonferroni corrected a=.017) showed 
that RT to targets was greater for high relative to low fear participants following 
spider images (M=62.3, SD=83.5; p=.010, g=1.09). These differences between 
groups were not significant following beetle images (M=45.2, SD=90.8; p=.010, 
g=.68), or butterfly images (M=50.1, SD=81.7; p=.010, g=.84). The main effect of 
image in the low fear group was non-significant, F(2, 22)=0.1, p = .896, hp2= 01. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean reaction time for targets following spider, butterfly and beetle cues 
for high and low spider fear groups (error bars represent 95% CIs). 
 
Peak P1 Amplitude 
 Figure 3 shows grand averaged ERP waveforms with average peak P1 
components occurring approximately 100ms post target onset for valid trials at the 
left (O1) and right (O2) occipital electrodes. 
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Figure 3. Grand averaged waveforms for valid trials at the left (O1) and right (O2) 
occipital electrodes with 2D map showing site amplitude at average peak P1 latency. 
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Table 3 shows the mean peak P1 amplitude to targets following spider, 
butterfly and beetle cues in valid trials for high and low fear groups at the left (O1) 
and right (O2) occipital electrodes.  
 
Table 3 
Mean Amplitude of Contralateral P1 Components at the Left (O1) and Right (O2) 
Occipital Electrodes Following Spider, Butterfly and Beetle Cues in Valid and 
Invalid Trials for High and Low Spider Fear Groups 
  Spider  Butterfly  Beetle 
  Valid Invalid  Valid Invalid  Valid Invalid 
Site: O1 Low Fear 4.2 
(1.6) 
6.5 
(2.9) 
 4.0 
(2.4) 
5.9 
(2.9) 
 3.8 
(2.5) 
6.1 
(2.9) 
 High Fear 7.5 
(1.6) 
8.9 
(2.9) 
 6.9 
(2.4) 
7.6 
(2.9) 
 7.4 
(2.5) 
7.9 
(2.9) 
Site: O2 Low Fear 5.3 
(2.7) 
6.5 
(3.1) 
 4.6 
(2.9) 
6.1 
(3.3) 
 5.3 
(2.7) 
5.9 
(2.6) 
 High Fear 7.4 
(2.3) 
9.2 
(2.0) 
 6.7 
(7.0) 
8.5 
(3.9) 
 7.0 
(2.8) 
9.1 
(3.0) 
Note. Means are presented in micro-volts. Standard deviations are presented in 
parentheses. 
 
A main effect of Validity was revealed, F(1, 26)=24.0, p<.001, hp2=.48, with 
invalid cues (M=7.0, SD=1.7) eliciting greater P1 amplitude than valid cues (M=6.0, 
SD=1.4). A main effect of Laterality was demonstrated, F(1, 26)=9.9, p=.004, 
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hp2=.28, with greater P1 amplitude found at the contralateral occipital electrode to 
the target (M=6.6, SD=1.5) than the ipsilateral occipital electrode (M=6.4, SD=1.5). 
There was a significant main effect of Group, F(1, 26)=9.6, p=.005, hp2=.27, with the 
high fear group obtaining higher P1 amplitude (M=7.7, SD=2.1) than the low fear 
group (M=5.2, SD=2.1), and a significant main effect of Image F(2, 52)=6.6, p=.003, 
hp2=.20, with all participants obtaining significantly greater P1 amplitude following 
spider cues (M=6.8, SD=1.4) compared to butterfly cues (M=6.3, SD=1.7, p=.005, 
g=.32) and beetle cues (M=6.4, SD=1.5, p=.003, g=.27).There was no significant 
difference in P1 amplitude generated following beetle compared to butterfly cues 
(p=.544, g=.06). The hypothesised Validity x Image x Group interaction was non-
significant F(2, 44)=0.19, p=.791, hp2=.01, indicating that the effects of Group and 
Image were the same across valid and invalid trials. 
A significant interaction of Validity x Laterality was found, F(1, 26)=11.6, 
p=.002, hp2=.31, with tests of simple effects revealing a significant effect of validity 
at contralateral sites to the target F(1, 26)=41.7, p<.001, hp2=.62, such that invalidly 
cued targets elicited greater P1 amplitude (M=7.4, SD=2.3) than validly cued targets 
(M=5.8, SD=2.1). This validity effect was not significant at ipsilateral sites, F(1, 
26)=2.3, p=.142, hp2=.08. 
The Visual Field x Laterality interaction was significant, F(1, 26)=5.2, 
p=.030, hp2=.17, with pairwise comparisons showing significant greater amplitude at 
the contralateral electrode (M=6.8, SD=2.4) compared to the ipsilateral electrode 
(M=6.1, SD=2.2; p=.002, g=.30) for targets presented in the left visual field. There 
was no significant difference between contralateral (M=6.4, SD=2.1) and ipsilateral 
sites (M=6.7, SD=2.3) following targets presented in the right visual field (p=.282, 
g=.13). The main effect of Visual Field target presentation was non-significant. All 
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other main effects and interactions were non-significant (See Table 1 in Appendix D 
for F-tests). 
Valence and Arousal Ratings 
 Table 4 contains the mean valence and arousal ratings for spider, butterfly, 
and beetle images. Analysis of valence ratings revealed a significant main effect of 
Image, F(2, 41)=115.8, p <.001, hp2=.82, with all participants rating spider images 
(M=3.0, SD=1.3) as significantly more unpleasant than butterfly images (M=6.7, 
SD=1.2, p<.001, g=2.92) and beetle images (M=5.3, SD=1.1 p<.001, g=1.88). The 
comparison between butterfly and beetle images was also significant (p<.001, 
g=1.20). There was a significant main effect of Group, F(1, 26)=14.7, p=.001, 
hp2=.36, with high fear participants rating all images as significantly less pleasant 
(M=4.4, SD=0.9) than the low fear group (M=5.7, SD=0.9, p=.001, g=1.40). 
 
Table 4 
Mean Valence and Arousal Ratings for Spider, Beetle and Butterfly Cue Images 
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
Main effects were qualified by a significant Image x Group interaction, F(1.6, 
40.7)=12.5, p<.001, hp2=.32. Tests of simple effects revealed that the low fear group 
demonstrated a significant effect of Image, F(1, 18)=23.9, p<.001, hp2=.65, with 
pairwise comparisons eliciting a significant difference across all image conditions, 
 Valence  Arousal 
 Spider Butterfly Beetle  Spider Butterfly Beetle 
Low Fear 4.4 (1.6)  7.2 (1.2) 5.4 (1.1)  2.5 (1.8) 2.5 (1.7) 2.1 (1.0) 
High Fear 1.7 (0.7) 6.3 (1.1) 5.1 (1.0)  4.9 (2.3) 1.9 (1.2) 2.4 (1.6) 
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such that low fear participants rated butterfly images as significantly more pleasant 
than beetle images (p<.001, g=1.52), and spider images (p<.001, g=1.85). The high 
fear group attained a significant effect of Image on valence ratings, F(2, 25)=156.5, 
p<.001, hp2=.92. The comparison of valence ratings in the high fear group for spider 
and beetle images did not reach significance after a Bonferroni correction (a=.017; 
p=.032, g=.68). All pairwise comparisons were significant (p<.001), with spider 
images rated less pleasant compared to beetle images (g=3.82), and butterfly images 
(g=4.84). Butterfly images were rated as significantly more pleasant than beetle 
images (g=1.11). A series of one-way ANOVAs (a=.017), revealed a significant 
difference between groups for spider images F(1, 26)=31.7, p<.001, g=2.07, and 
non-significant differences between butterfly images F(1, 26)=3.9, p=.059, g=.72, 
and beetle images F(1, 26)=0.7, p=.398, g=.32. 
Analysis of arousal ratings revealed a significant main effect of Image, F(1, 
33)=11.4, p=.001, hp2=.31, with all participants rating spider images (M=3.7, 
SD=2.1) as more arousing than beetle images (M=2.3, SD=1.3, p<.001, g=.79). 
Butterfly images (M=2.2, SD=1.5) were rated as less arousing than spider images 
(p=.003, g=.81). Arousal ratings for butterfly and beetle images were not 
significantly different (p=.830, g=.07). The main effect of Group was non-significant 
F(1, 126)=2.15, p=.154, hp2=.08. There was a significant Image x Group interaction, 
F(1, 33)=10.02, p=.002, hp2=.28, with tests of simple effects revealing a significant 
difference in Image for the high fear group, F(1, 18)=18.0, p<.001, hp2=.58. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that spider images were rated by the high fear group as 
significantly more arousing than both beetle images (p<.011, g=.1.23) and butterfly 
images (p<.001, g=1.59) respectively. A series of one-way ANOVAs (a=.017), 
revealed a significant difference between groups for spider images F(1, 26)=10.1, 
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p=.004, g=1.16, and non-significant differences between butterfly images F(1, 
26)=1.2, p=.284, g=.40, and beetle images F(1, 26)=0.2, p=.630, g=.18. 
Subjective Units of Distress Scale ratings 
Table 5 shows the mean Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS) ratings. 
Tests of between subjects effects showed a significant main effect of Group, F(1, 
26)=8.8, p=.006, hp2 =25, such that the high fear group rated their distress levels as 
higher (M=15.8, SD=10.8) than the low fear group (M=3.7, SD=10.8; g=1.09). A 
main effect of Rating was found, F(2, 49)=7.8, p =.001, hp2=.23. This was qualified 
by a significant Rating x Group interaction, F(2, 49)=10.1, p <.001, hp2 =.28, with 
tests of simple effects revealing a significant effect of Rating in the high fear group, 
F(2, 24)=12.4, p<.001, hp2=.49, such that ratings of distress increased from times 1-2 
(p<.001, g=.95), 1-3 (p<.001, g=.90), and 1-4 (p=.002, g=.80). Ratings at times 2-3 
did not differ significantly (p=.865, g=.03), nor did ratings 2-4 (p=1.000, g<.001), or 
3-4 (p=.844, g=.02). There was no significant effect of rating in the low fear group 
F(2, 18)=7.9, p=.749, hp2=.02.  
 
Table 5 
Mean Subjective Units of Distress Scale Ratings Obtained Prior to Task and During 
Task Breaks 
   Subjective Units of Distress Scale 
 Rating 1 Rating 2 Rating 3 Rating 4 
Low Fear 4.3 (7.6) 3.2 (4.2) 3.2 (4.6) 3.9 (6.6) 
High Fear 6.1 (10.6) 18.9 (15.1) 19.3 (17.0) 18.9 (19.2) 
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
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Discussion 
The aim of the present research was to investigate attentional biases of the 
orienting network in high spider fearful individuals, including disengagement 
difficulty and hypervigilance. Attentional Control Theory (ACT) posits that anxiety 
results in disruption between the orienting and executive control networks of the 
attention system, characterised by increased bottom-up (stimulus driven) processing 
and decreased top-down (goal-directed) processing, thus leading to increased 
dependence on the orienting system in response to a stimulus, and less influence 
from the executive control system (Eysenck et al., 2007).  
The hypothesis that high fear participants would show faster reaction times 
and greater P1 amplitude following valid spider (feared) cues as an indicator of 
hypervigilance compared to low spider fear participants was not supported, with a 
significant Image x Group interaction instead showing a general slowing of reaction 
time among high fear participants compared to low fear participants across all image 
types, which was greatest for spider trials regardless of validity. As ERP evidence for 
cortical hypervigilance, it was expected that high fear participants would produce 
greater P1 amplitude to targets following spider cues, followed by beetle and 
butterfly cues respectively. This hypothesis was not supported due to a non-
significant Group x Validity x Image interaction. However, there were significant 
main effects of Group and Image, such that high fear participants obtained greater P1 
amplitude following all images in comparison to low fear participants, and P1 
amplitude time-locked to the target following spider cues was greater than beetle and 
butterfly conditions overall. 
Finally, as evidence for disengagement difficulty it was hypothesised that 
high fear participants would display slower reaction times following invalid spider 
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cues compared to low fear participants, however, this was not supported given the 
non-significant Image x Validity x Group interaction.  
Behavioural Measures 
Reaction Time. The hypothesised differences in reaction time in high fear 
participants indexing hypervigilance and disengagement difficulty were not found, 
which is surprising given that the majority of previous research has demonstrated 
enhanced hypervigilance by faster reaction time obtained by high fear participants in 
the dot-probe task (Lipp & Derakshan, 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2006). However, 
there is some evidence for generalised slowing within the dot-probe task (Yiend & 
Mathews, 2001). The finding that reaction times were greater across all image 
conditions in the high fear group is more indicative of an interference effect, adding 
further evidence to Johnstone’s (2015) finding of generalised slowing in high fear 
participants (interpreted as interference). However, in the present research, slowed 
reaction times following spider cues were significantly greater in high fear compared 
to low fear participants. This slowing suggests greater interference effects under 
conditions of higher state anxiety. This may be due to disruption of the ventral and 
dorsal components of the orienting network, such that the overactive ventral system 
(bottom-up, automatic orienting) disrupts top-down control over the top-down 
orienting system (ventral orienting network; Petersen & Posner, 2012).  
Given that this paradigm included a discrimination task rather than the 
detection task used by Johnstone (2015), it is also possible that high fear participants 
were more susceptible to interference due to increased cognitive load, with greater 
attentional interference demonstrated following spider images than beetle and 
butterfly images. This is in contrast to Johnstone’s (2015) finding of greater reaction 
times for high fear participants in both threat-related and neutral images, which was 
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interpreted as general interference. The present findings are consistent with ACT 
(Eysenck et al., 2007) and demonstrate that high fear participants may be less able to 
inhibit emotional impact on behaviour, as elicited through exposure to feared images. 
Eysenck and colleagues (2007) postulated that the interference effects of anxiety on 
attentional control would become greater as task demands increase, which helps to 
explain the greater slowing found following spider images relative to neutral images 
in the present research compared to the general slowing found by Johnstone (2015). 
It is possible that increased cognitive load in visual tasks serves to amplify the 
slowing effects in reaction time due to interference caused by state anxiety. 
It is thought that early attentional biases may involve an automatic amygdala 
response following exposure to threat-related stimuli (Cisler & Koster, 2010). This is 
consistent with research positing that the amygdala receives visual threat-related 
information via the magnocellular route and thalamo-amygdala connection which 
transmits information to the visual cortex (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Öhman, 
2009). Further research should investigate whether the interference effects found in 
this study are tied to this automatic amygdala response. 
Accuracy. Whilst there were no specific hypotheses regarding accuracy, it is 
interesting to note the significant main effect of image, with all participants obtaining 
lowest accuracy to targets preceded by spider images. However, high fear 
participants also showed a reduction in efficiency for spider trials, demonstrated by 
additional slowing of reaction time. Although non-significant following a Bonferroni 
correction, this difference was a moderate to large sized effect. This further supports 
the proposal of an interference effect regardless of fear status, yet amplified for 
people with high spider fear. Early visual identification of threatening images such as 
spiders has been postulated to be a phylogenetic mechanism in which all people are 
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evolutionarily programmed to show hypervigilance to potentially threatening stimuli 
as a primitive survival mechanism (Öhman, 2009). There was no evidence of a 
speed-accuracy trade-off, as no other main effects or interactions were significant. 
Electrophysiological Correlates of Attention 
Cortical hypervigilance was expected to be demonstrated by increased P1 
amplitude between groups, with the high fear group attaining greater amplitude than 
the low fear group overall, in line with previous research (Kolassa et al., 2006; 
Venetacci, 2014). It was also expected that P1 amplitude increase would be 
dependent on image type such that spiders would elicit greater P1 amplitude 
followed by beetles and butterfly images respectively in each group. However, in the 
present study, there was a main effect of Group found in P1 amplitude such that the 
high fear group attained greater amplitude than the low fear group, thus eliciting an 
expected effect that Johnstone (2015) did not. Nonetheless, this was not qualified by 
the hypothesised Group x Image interaction in which it was expected that spider 
images would lead to greater P1 amplitude to the target than neutral or positive 
valence images.  
This finding is consistent with research by Kolassa and colleagues (2006) 
which utilised an emotional Stroop paradigm. Kolassa and colleagues found that both 
phobic groups (social phobia and arachnophobia) demonstrated increased P1 
amplitude in comparison to psychologically healthy control participants. They 
concluded that early ERP components are modified by anxiety status and not 
necessarily by exposure to representations of the specific phobia.  
A supplementary finding in this research not central to the hypotheses, but 
worthy of discussion, is the reverse validity effect found in the P1 component. This 
was demonstrated via a Validity x Laterality interaction showing a greater P1 
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amplitude arising from invalid trials at contralateral sites to the target. This is in 
direct contrast to research by Fu and colleagues (2005), which provided evidence for 
greater P1 amplitude recorded at posterior sites (occipital, temporal and parietal 
electrodes) for valid rather than invalid trials. 
Ordinarily in spatial cueing paradigms, valid trials result in higher P1 
amplitude than invalid trials (Chica et al., 2013; Eimer, 1998; Fu et al., 2001; 
Hopfinger & West, 2006; Luck, 1995; Mangun, 1995; Talsma et al., 2007). Whilst 
the reverse validity effect found in the present research is not entirely uncommon in 
previous literature, it is often found when cognitive load is increased (Fu et al., 
2009), or ISI durations are longer (566-766ms; Hopfinger & Mangun, 2001). Other 
studies have found mixed results dependent on other variables. For example, 
Rossignol et al. (2013) found greater amplitude P1 components following valid cues 
in participants with high fear of negative evaluation (FNE), but greater amplitude 
following invalid cues in low FNE participants. Santesso et al. (2008) found greater 
P1 amplitude for valid trials following presentation of an angry face, yet greater P1 
amplitude in invalid trials following happy faces.  
This research aimed to build upon the findings of Johnstone (2015), by 
modifying the paradigm to increase the likelihood of finding evidence for specific 
behavioural and cortical hypervigilance and difficulty disengaging. ISIs and stimulus 
durations for this modified spatial cueing paradigm were chosen based on research 
by Mogg et al. (2008) and Koster et al. (2006a), whose findings we also aimed to 
extend. As suggested by Chica et al. (2014), a discrimination task was chosen over a 
detection task in order to increase cognitive load and increase facilitatory effects. 
This was also intended to avoid any effects which may be attributed to inhibition of 
return (IOR; Posner, Rafal, Choate & Vaughan, 1985). IOR is proposed to be an 
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evolutionary predisposition in which humans avoid attending to previously attended 
locations, with the attentional system instead directing attention to un-cued locations 
(Klein, 1988). IOR typically occurs in discrimination tasks with stimulus onset 
asynchronies (SOAs) of approximately 700ms duration. Discrimination tasks are also 
not as reliant on the inclusion of catch trials (in which no target appears proceeding a 
cue for a certain percentage of trials) as detection tasks, as the accuracy of 
discrimination itself is ample to ensure task compliance without the inclusion of 
catch trials.  
The effect of the cue on the target-locked ERPs wave necessitated the 
extraction of longer epochs (-300ms–700ms). This was due to a short ISI (50ms) 
used in this paradigm. As there is a lack of ERP research utilising a spatial cueing 
paradigm with threat-related image cues, the design of this task was mostly based on 
studies eliciting behavioural results only (Koster et al., 2006a; 2006b; Mogg et al., 
2008). Cleaner ERP waves could have been generated by using the Adjacent 
Response (Adjar) technique (Woldorff, 1993), in which ISIs are varied or ‘jittered’. 
Theoretically, if the variation in ISIs is wide enough, overlapping adjacent responses 
in the ERP wave will be cancelled out during the averaging process. Bound by time 
and software constraints, it was not possible to conduct this technique in the present 
research. 
Whilst investigation of ERP components of disengagement was not included 
in this research, it is notable that a reliable electrophysiological marker of 
disengagement remains elusive. Although there have been a number of ERP 
components proposed as markers of attentional disengagement such as the P4pc 
(Toffanin, de Jong & Johnson,2011), IIN (Hopfinger & Ries, 2005; Shin, Hopfinger, 
Lust, Henry & Bartholow, 2010) and N2pc (Buodo, Sarlo & Munafo, 2010; Eimer & 
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Kiss 2007; 2008; Weymar, Gerdes, Low, Alpers & Hamm, 2013), these have all 
been investigated in different attentional paradigms such as visual search and visual 
detection tasks. At this point in time, evidence in the literature thus far is 
inconclusive, with certain laboratories mainly replicating their own research. 
Investigation of these various markers was beyond the scope of the present research, 
however, further research is warranted given that investigation of 
electrophysiological markers of attentional disengagement is in its infancy. 
Whilst high fear participants in this research did elicit greater amplitude P1 
components than low fear participants, this is indicative of general rather than 
specific hypervigilance.  However, given that there were no behavioural indicators of 
hypervigilance, the increased P1 amplitude demonstrated by high fear participants 
may be indicative of increased early visual processing and greater attentional 
selection required for target processing following cue-related interference. Given that 
the present study limited analyses to occipital electrodes, it may be worth 
investigating sites over the temporal and parietal regions in order to better record 
activity from locations outlined by Corbetta and Shulman (2002), which Petersen and 
Posner integrated into their latest attentional network model (2012). These areas 
include the frontal eye fields and intraparietal sulcus/superior parietal lobe (dorsal 
attention system), and the temporoparietal junction and ventral frontal cortex (ventral 
attention system; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). 
Certainly, further research is warranted in order to untangle these specific 
mechanisms of attentional bias more thoroughly. There some suggestion by Petersen 
and Posner (2012) that constructs such as emotional self-regulation may impact on 
individual variance in attentional ERP components. As there was no measure of self-
regulation included in the present research, this adds an extraneous variable that 
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warrants further studies in emotional visual attention tasks inclusive of measures of 
self-regulation. For example, the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; 
Gratz & Roemer, 2004). 
Limitations 
Key limitations of the present research include under-powered analyses due 
to insufficient sample size. Due to inherent time constraints and the exclusion of data 
points in order to maintain a clean sample, 14 participants were included in each 
group, despite a G-Power recommendation of 15 participants per group for 
appropriate power and effect sizes in mixed measures ANOVA. The findings of this 
research should be considered preliminary until replicated with a greater sample size.  
Participants were screened with measures of spider fear, but a clinical 
diagnosis was not obtained for specific phobia. It is possible that different or greater 
effect sizes would be observed if comparing spider-phobics to low-fear non-phobics. 
It is also worth noting that measures of trait anxiety (STAI), verbal intelligence 
(WTAR), and psychological distress (K10) were trending toward significance, with 
moderate effect sizes noted such that the high fear group attained greater scores on 
the STAI and K10, while the low fear group scored higher on the WTAR. Future 
research should aim to match groups on such factors to limit variance that may be 
due to these factors rather than the manipulated variables. 
 Another limitation involves the absence of eye-tracking technology in order 
to ensure participants maintained visual focus on the central fixation cross as 
instructed. Although horizontal and vertical EOG activity was monitored and their 
effects on surrounding electrodes limited, this is a less accurate technique than the 
integration of eye-tracking technology in such a study where exogenous spatial cues 
are used. Integration of eye-tracking technology would have provided more 
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definitive confirmation of gaze fixation on the central fixation cross when cues and 
targets were presented peripherally. Horizontal eye movements were monitored 
using horizontal eye electrodes to ensure movement was minimal, however, without 
eye-tracking technology it is not possible to know the true extent of eye movements. 
This has implications for whether covert attention is truly being measured, rather 
than overt attention. 
In order to thoroughly investigate disengagement difficulty, the spatial cueing 
paradigm would benefit from a greater number of trials (in particular invalid trials), 
in order to improve the signal-to-noise ratio in the ERP recordings. This is necessary 
in order to better examine the disengagement and shifting of attention away from a 
feared stimulus that would be generated by invalid cues. Considering there needs to 
be a greater ratio of valid to invalid trials in order for cues to be predictive (Chica et 
al., 2014), and therefore, for hypervigilance to be investigated, hypervigilance and 
disengagement mechanisms would theoretically need to be studied within separate 
paradigms, as 50% validity in similar research has been demonstrated to elicit neither 
hypervigilance nor disengagement (Johnstone, 2015). Thus, future research 
investigating disengagement difficulty should make use of predictive cues with 
validity of 75% and over.  
Implications 
This research provides evidence for ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007). ACT posits 
that anxiety results in disruption between the orienting and executive control 
networks of the attention system, characterised by increased bottom-up (stimulus 
driven) processing and decreased top-down (goal-directed) processing, thus leading 
to increased dependence on the orienting system and reduced influence of the 
executive control network (Eysenck et al., 2007). For example, goal-directed action 
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(such as responding to the dot pair in the modified spatial cueing task) is delayed due 
to stimulus driven impulses, such as being in the presence of a feared stimulus. The 
finding of slowed reaction time among high fear participants adds support to this 
theory.  
The finding that high fear participants in this study seemed to exert greater 
attentional resources following all images, but spiders in particular, has implications 
for a more integrative approach in studying the potential interference effects and 
increased attentional processing following exposure to threatening stimuli. ERP 
techniques have excellent temporal specificity, so whilst studies using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology have seen increased popularity in 
the past decade, there is more to be discovered within the temporal domains of 
attentional biases.  
This research has implications for a more comprehensive understanding of 
attentional processes and how these may be modulated by emotions such as fear. 
This will lead to the development of more effective treatments for individuals with 
specific fear or clinical phobia, for example, attention bias modification (Fox et al., 
2015). 
Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to investigate attentional biases specific to the 
orienting network of attention in high spider fear participants compared to low fear 
participants. Previous research provides support for attentional bias towards threat in 
anxiety, as well as specific fear via measures of hypervigilance, however, there is 
inconsistency within the literature in regards to disengagement difficulty and 
avoidance of threatening stimuli. Hypotheses regarding hypervigilance and 
disengagement difficulty were not supported. However, the behavioural results of 
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this study indicated a general slowing effect in reaction time among high fear 
participants that was greater following spider cues than beetle or butterfly cues. This 
finding can be considered preliminary support for ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) in 
specific fear, and may arise due to interference mechanisms arising though threat-
related attentional capture and subsequent amygdala activation. However, these 
results should be interpreted with caution as further replication is necessary to 
address the limitations of the present research. Electrophysiological results indicated 
greater P1 amplitude in the high fear group following all image conditions compared 
to the low fear group, suggestive of generalised cortical hypervigilance and increased 
attentional processing in high fear participants. 
Future research in this area is encouraged in order to better understand the 
influence of emotions such as fear on the attentional networks and how these are 
demonstrated through behavioural and electrophysiological indices. Further studies 
in this area will not only increase understanding of attentional processes but also 
enable the development of more effective and treatments for specific phobia. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Experimental Screening Questionnaire 
 
Note	to	interviewer:	When	booking,	ask	participant	not	to	consume	caffeine	(2	
hrs),	tobacco	(2hrs),	alcohol	(24	hours)	and	illicit	drugs	(none)	prior	to	session,	and	
let	them	know	that	they	may	have	some	residual	electrode	gel	in	their	hair	when	
they	leave	the	session	
Experimental	session	questions		
(To	be	completed	on	the	day	of	the	experimental	session)	
Date	____/____/____	 	 	 	 	 Participant	ID	____________	
1. Check	that	participant	has	abstained	from	alcohol	for	24	hours	and	illicit	drug	use	
since	completing	the	screening	questionnaire	
3.	 How	many	cups	of	coffee	(or	any	other	caffeinated	drinks/products)	have	you	
consumed	today?	_____		
If	>	0.	How	many	hours	since	your	last	caffeinated	drink	______	hours	
4.	 Have	you	had	any	tobacco	or	nicotine	products	today?	Yes	/	No		
If	yes,	how	many	cigarettes	(or	nicotine	products)	have	you	had	today?	____	
If	yes,	How	many	hours	since	your	last	cigarette	(nicotine	product)	______	hours	
5.		 Have	you	consumed	any	medications	in	the	past	week	(or	any	prescribed	
medications	since	completing	the	screening	questionnaire)?	
If	yes,	please	detail:		
	
6.	Approximately	how	many	hours	sleep	did	you	have	last	night?	____	
Karolinska	sleepiness	scale	(participant	can	self-complete)	
Please	circle	on	the	following	scale	of	1	to	9	how	you	feel	AT	THE	PRESENT	
MOMENT:	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	
Very	
alert	
	 Alert	–	
normal	
level	
	 Neither	
alert	nor	
sleepy	
	 Sleepy	–	
but	no	
effort	to	
stay	
awake	
	 Very	
sleepy,	
great	
effort	to	
stay	
awake,	
fighting	
 
Medication	 Number	of	
occasions	
Time	since	last	used	 Estimated	dose	
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What was the date of the first day of your last period?  If you don't 
remember the exact date you can give an approximate range (e.g. 5-8 
May): 
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Date:	___________________	 Participant:	__________	
	
Video	Gaming	Experience	Questionnaire	We	are	interested	in	how	often	you	play	video	games,	and	may	use	this	information	to	examine	the	effects	of	video	game	playing	on	visual	attention	and	motor	skills.		How	often	would	you	normally	play	video	games?	Please	choose	one	response.		 Never	play	video	games	Rarely	play	video	games	(less	than	2	hours	a	month)	Occasionally	play	video	games	(between	30	minutes	and	2	hours	a	week)	Regularly	play	video	games	(between	2	hours	and	5	hours	a	week)	Often	play	video	games	(more	than	5	hours	a	week)	
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Appendix B 
Ethics Approval Letter 
 
 
 
22/09/2016, 7:38 PMEthics Amendment Approval: H0011104 The effects of real ve... - Tess Nikitenko
Page 1 of 2https://outlook.office.com/owa/?viewmodel=ReadMessageItem&Ite…HXgy0drFAAFQsNcRAAA%3D&IsPrintView=1&wid=54&ispopout=1&path=
Ethics Amendment Approval: H0011104 The effects of real versus
hyper-real images on computer-based exposure treatment for
spider phobia.
Dear Dr Matthews
 
Ethics Ref: H0011104 
Title: The effects of real versus hyper-real images on computer-based exposure treatment for spider phobia.
 
This email is to confirm that the following amendment was approved by the Chair of the Tasmania Social Sciences
Human Research Ethics Committee on 31/3/2016:
1.     Removal of Honours students Isabel Hoystead, and Shelley Flynn.
2.     Addition of incoming 2016 Honours students Tess Nikitenko and Monique Williams.
3.     Modification to the attentional tasks used in the study.
4.     Revised Attachment D - Information Sheet and Attachment E - Consent Form.
 
All committees operating under the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network are registered and required
to comply with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (NHMRC 2007, updated May 2015).
 
This email constitutes official approval. If your circumstances require a formal letter of amendment approval, please let us
know.
 
Should you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact me.
 
Kind regards
Katherine
 
Katherine Shaw
Executive Officer, Social Sciences HREC
Office of Research Services | Research Division
University of Tasmania
Private Bag 1
Hobart TAS 7001
T +61 3 6226 2763
Katherine Shaw
Fri 1/04/2016 1:23 PM
To:Allison Matthews <allison.matthews@utas.edu.au>;
Cc:Kenneth Kirkby <ken.kirkby@utas.edu.au>; Amber Johnstone <amberj@utas.edu.au>; Tess Nikitenko <tessn@utas.edu.au>;
Monique Williams <monique.williams@utas.edu.au>;
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Appendix C 
Participant Consent and Information Sheet 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Spider Fear, Brain Activity, and Attention 
 
Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a research study into the effects of spider 
fear on attention during the viewing of spider images. This is an Honours 
study being conducted by Monique Williams and Tess Nikitenko under the 
supervision of Dr Allison Matthews (Chief Investigator, School of Medicine, 
Psychology). 
 
1. ‘What is the purpose of this study?’ 
The purpose is to investigate brain processes involved in attentional 
processing among males and females with high and low spider fear. 
 
2. ‘Why have I been invited to participate in this study?’ 
You are eligible to participate in this study because you have an intense fear 
of spiders or that you have a relatively low of fear spiders. 
 
4. ‘What does this study involve?’ 
This study will require you to attend one session (approximately 2 hours) at 
the University of Tasmania. In this session you will complete some 
questionnaires relating to your fear of spiders. You will then complete some 
computer tasks where you will respond (using a button press) to particular 
aspects of visual stimuli presented on a computer screen. These stimuli may 
include pictures, letters or objects (and may include pictures of spiders). Your 
brain activity will be measured while you complete these tasks.  
 
It is important that you understand that your involvement is this study is 
voluntary. While we would be pleased to have you participate, we respect 
your right to decline. There will be no consequences to you if you decide not 
to participate, and this will not affect your relationship with the University. If 
you decide to discontinue participation at any time, you may do so without 
providing an explanation. All information will be treated in a confidential 
manner, and your name will not be used in any publication arising out of the 
research. All of the research will be kept in a locked cabinet in the office of Dr 
Allison Matthews or on a secure server at the University of Tasmania. 
 
5. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
You may or may not experience anxiety during the course of the study. 
However, if you do, it is hoped that you will notice a reduction in your anxiety 
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after a certain period of time. The results of this study will provide valuable 
information on the attentional processes involved in spider fear and will help 
us to further develop an online treatment program for people with phobias. 
 
6. Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
If you experience anxiety during the study, this may be unpleasant and 
include emotions of fear and worrying thoughts, wishing to avoid the 
situation, physical discomforts such as palpitations, sweating and over-
breathing. The researchers will provide you with information for dealing with 
these symptoms if they unduly trouble you. However, if you find that you are 
becoming distressed or experience significantly elevated levels of anxiety you 
will be advised to receive support from a clinician or alternatively, we will 
arrange for you to see a counsellor at no expense to you.. 
 
There are no specific risks associated with the measurement of brain activity. 
However, if you have sensitive skin there is a small possibility of a slight skin 
reaction from electrode preparation materials. If you believe there is a chance 
that your skin may react you are advised to reconsider participation.  
 
7. What if I have questions about this research? 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study, or require further 
assistance with your fear of spiders after the study is completed, please feel 
free to contact Dr Allison Matthews on ph (03) 62267236, who would be happy 
to discuss any aspect of the research with you. Once we have analysed the 
information we will be putting a summary of our findings on the School of 
Psychology website for you to view. You are welcome to contact us at that time 
to discuss any issue relating to the research study. 
 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Science Human 
Research Ethics Committee.  If you have concerns or complaints about the 
conduct of this study should contact the Executive Officer of the HREC 
(Tasmania) Network on (03) 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. 
The Executive Officer is the person nominated to receive complaints from 
research participants. You will need to quote [H0011104]. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to consider this study. If you wish to take 
part in it, please sign the attached consent form. This information sheet is 
for you to keep. 
 
Chief Investigator: Dr Allison Matthews 
Student Investigators: Monique Williams and Tess Nikitenko 
 
 
	
CONSENT FORM 
Spider Fear, Brain Activity, and Attention 
  
1. I have read and understood the 'Information Sheet' for this project. 
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
3. I understand that the study involves attending one session (approx. 2 hours) at 
the University of Tasmania whereby I will complete some questionnaires and 
some computer based attention tasks. These tasks may involve responding to 
pictures (including spiders), letters, or objects and brain activity will be 
monitored throughout the process.  
4. I understand that participation involves some risk of experiencing a 
heightened level of anxiety; however, the researcher will be present at all 
times, I will be given information on how to cope with anxiety, and I will be 
referred to a counsellor if need be. I understand that measurement of brain 
activity involves minimal risk, and slight skin irritation may occur if I have 
sensitive skin. 
5. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of 
Tasmania premises for ten years and will then be destroyed. 
6. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
7. I agree that research data gathered from me for the study may be published 
provided that I cannot be identified as a participant.  
8. I understand that the researchers will maintain my identity confidential and 
that any information I supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the 
purposes of the research.  
9. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may withdraw 
at any time without any effect, and if I so wish, may request that any data I 
have supplied to date be withdrawn from the research. 
  
Name of Participant: 
Signature: Date: 
 
Statement by Investigator 
 
 I have explained the project & the implications of participation in it to this volunteer 
and I believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the 
implications of participation  
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them 
participating, the following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been 
provided so participants have the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to 
participate in this project. 
Name of Investigator  
Signature of Investigator  
 
 
	
Dealing with Anxiety 
The Nature of Anxiety 
Anxiety is a normal and healthy reaction that allows you to deal with threat or danger. When you are 
confronted by a threatening situation your body automatically releases hormones which send signals 
to the body to prepare to ‘fight’ or ‘flight’. We become more alert, our heartbeat speeds up, the muscles 
get tense ready for action, sweating increases to cool the body, and breathing rate speeds up so that we 
can get oxygen into our bodies more quickly. These changes allow us to run very quickly or fight our 
enemies. Sometimes when our breathing rate increases, we tend to over breathe or hyperventilate. This 
hyperventilation may cause a number of symptoms including dizziness, breathlessness or chest pains. 
It is important to realise that these feelings are part of a physical response to threat and are not a sign 
that you have some physical disease. These symptoms do not mean that you will die, go crazy, or lose 
control. 
 
Management of Anxiety 
Although anxiety is a normal, and at times, a useful response, excessive anxiety may interfere with 
your everyday life. Anxiety can be managed by reversing or interrupting the flight-or-flight response 
through the use of breathing or relaxation techniques. To reduce symptoms of hyperventilation it is 
necessary to increase and steady the levels of carbon dioxide in the blood. One method to do this is 
breathing into a paper bag. Another method to reduce over breathing and to prevent anxiety from 
escalating is the slow breathing exercise (see below). This exercise can be practiced daily and used at 
any time that you notice sensations of anxiety. 
 
Breathing Exercise 
1. Hold your breath and count to 5 (do not take a deep breath). 
2. When you get to 5, breathe out and say the word ‘relax’ in a calm soothing manner. 
3. Breathe in and out slowly through your nose in a 6 second cycle (breathe in for 3 seconds & out for 
3 seconds). This will produce a breathing rate of 10 breaths per minute. Say ‘relax’ to yourself 
when you breathe out. 
4. At the end of each minute hold your breath for 5 seconds and then continue breathing using the 6 
second cycle 
5. Continue breathing this way until all of the symptoms of over breathing have gone. 
 
Exposure Treatment for Anxiety 
If your anxiety is associated with specific objects or situations (such as spiders) it is also possible to 
reduce anxiety through exposure to the feared object or situation. It is important to remain in the 
feared situation until there is a decrease in anxiety. Although your anxiety may rise when 
confronting the situation, it will also fall within a few minutes. By remaining in the situation you 
will learn that there is nothing to fear. 
 
What do I do if I am experiencing high levels of anxiety during the treatment? 
If you are feeling anxious during the treatment, try to remain calm and do the above breathing 
exercise. Remember your anxiety will fall in a few minutes. If your anxiety becomes overwhelming, 
you are free to stop the treatment. If you are undertaking a session in the research clinic you will be 
assisted by the researchers to regain your composure. You do not have to continue with the treatment 
if you do not wish to. 
 
If your anxiety becomes overwhelming when you are completing the treatment at home, again, try to 
remain calm and do the above breathing exercise. Remember your anxiety will fall in a few minutes. If 
you choose to stop following a circle on the screen with the computer mouse, the stimulus on the 
screen will disappear. This will allow you time to regain your composure. When you are ready to start 
again, you can start following the circle and the image will reappear. Again you are free to stop the 
treatment at any stage. You may like to enlist the help of a friend or relative, by showing them this 
information, they may be able to assist you should the need arise. If you are hyperventilating and the 
breathing exercise does not help, you may like to have a paper bag handy that you can breathe into. 
This will help to stop you from over breathing. 
 
What if I need further help or treatment? 
 
 
	
Please note that this information is NOT a substitute for diagnosis and treatment by an appropriate 
health professional. Please let us know if you require further assistance and we can refer you to an 
appropriate health professional. Your GP will also be able to refer you for further assessment and 
treatment if required. 
 
The School of Medicine (Psychology), University of Tasmania, is not a health or crisis service and does 
not have the capacity to provide clinical advice or assistance if you require these services. If you need 
urgent medical or psychological assistance, please contact your local doctor/GP or other health 
professional, or the emergency department of your local hospital.  
 
  
 
 
	
Appendix D 
Non-significant, hypothesis relevant effects 
 
Table 1 
Non-significant F-tests for Accuracy, Reaction Time and Peak P1 Amplitude. 
Effect df F p hp2 
Accuracy     
Group 1, 26 27.0 .545 .014 
Validity 1, 26 1.71 .202 .062 
Validity x Group 1, 26 1.52 .228 .055 
Image x Group 2, 46 1.74 .186 .063 
Image x Validity 2, 43 0.13 .879 .005 
Image x Validity x Group 3, 43 0.01 .985 .000 
Reaction Time     
Validity x Group 1, 26 0.002 .967 .000 
Image x Validity 2, 46 2.88 .072 .100 
Image x Validity x Group 2, 46 0.78 .450 .029 
P1 Amplitude     
Image x Group 2, 46 0.49 .594 .019 
Validity x Group 1, 26 0.38 .542 .014 
Validity x Visual Field x Group 1, 26 3.36 .078 .114 
 
